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Justifying a Presumption of Restraint in Animal Biotechnology Research

Abstract
Articulating the public’s widespread unease about animal biotechnology has not
been easy, and the first attempts have not been able to provide an effective tool for
navigating the moral permissibility of this research. Because these moral intuitions have
been difficult to cash out, they have been belittled as representing nothing more than fear
or confusion. But there are sound philosophical reasons supporting the public’s
opposition to animal biotechnology and these arguments justify a default position of
resistance I call the Presumption of Restraint. The Presumption of Restraint constitutes a
justificatory process that sets out the criteria for permitting or rejecting individual
biotechnology projects. This Presumption of Restraint can be overridden by compelling
arguments that speak to a project’s moral and scientific merit. This strategy creates a
middle-of-the-road stance that can embrace particular projects, while rejecting others.
The Presumption of Restraint can also serve as a model for assessing moral permissibility
in other areas of technological innovation.
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Justifying a Presumption of Restraint in Animal Biotech Research

In the decade following the cloning of Dolly the Sheep in 1996, the science of
animal biotechnology has made steady -- even remarkable -- progress, but the public’s
comfort with these new technologies has not increased. Although over half of the public
is opposed to this research (Saad 2004; PIFB 2005), there is very little active dialogue
between the proponents of this science and the critics. One explanation for the absence
of a robust debate is the challenge of articulating the public’s opposition in a form that
doesn’t simply reduce to a pure emotivist reaction, which is quickly dismissed by the
proponents as parochial or naive. Attempts to give a substantive critique have faced
difficult objections from the advocates of this science. On the other side of this fledgling
dialogue is not so much an articulated pro-animal biotech position but an attack on the
anti-biotech arguments that lays bare the difficulty of capturing theoretically the ethical
problems with many of the projects of this new science. But in the absence of
compelling arguments critiquing biotechnology, or at least certain parts of it, the net
result is a presumption in favor of it. Most worrisome about the state of this debate is
what is being implicitly condoned. Having no effective argument to rein in animal
biotechnology or distinguish the moral permissibility of various projects, we are tacitly
permitting all of them.
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Of course, all research in the US that involves animals is regulated at one level:
research protocols need to pass the scrutiny of the Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee (IACUC) that protects animals from unnecessary pain and suffering and
mandates adequate pain relief during research procedures. There is also the selfregulation imposed by the scientists themselves, and in their peer-review protocol
assessments. But in the US to date, there is no over-arching ethical framework or gatekeeping mechanism that determines which projects are ethically justified and which are
not.
As a way of offering more concrete ethical guidance to animal biotechnology
research, I will argue for a position that I call the “Presumption of Restraint:” a default
position of wariness that must be overcome by morally compelling reasons in order to
justify a particular project’s moral legitimacy or permissibility. This is not an argument
for the prohibition of animal biotech research and commercialization that follows from
some anti-biotech arguments. The Presumption of Restraint amounts to a “proceed with
caution” stance that can be overcome rather than a blanket opposition, and it stands in
direct contrast to the overly permissive approach that currently prevails.
To understand the need for a stronger articulation of the critique of animal
biotechnology, I begin with a review of the often-cited anti-biotech arguments that have
recurred in the literature, and I highlight the key objections raised against these
arguments. While these arguments are quite suggestive, they are not powerful enough as
they stand to justify the Presumption of Restraint. Using specific cases of animal
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biotechnology as a focal point for the discussion, as well as insights gleaned from these
anti-biotech arguments, I present the argument for restraint, which I believe goes a long
distance in articulating the public’s intuition that this science is moving too fast and
without due reflection and scrutiny. This approach lays out legitimate reasons for
concern about these new technologies, while showing the way in which some – or even
many – of them might be morally justified. Rather than condemn or embrace all animal
biotechnology projects, this approach constitutes a middle-of-the-road position that
escapes the “all or nothing” character of the debate as it now stands.

The Current Critiques of Animal Biotechnology
The recent anti-biotechnology arguments have been made against the backdrop of
strong public opposition to this new science. Public opinion data consistently shows that
more than half of Americans oppose animal biotechnology, with the numbers differing
slightly depending on the type of modification. A 2004 Gallup poll, for example, found
that 64% of Americans believe that animal cloning is morally wrong (Saad 2004), and a
2005 poll conducted for the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology found a similar
66% opposed to animal cloning (PIFB 2005). Interestingly, opposition to animal cloning
remains high even among individuals who rarely attend religious services, normally an
indicator of more liberal views. From their latest poll, the Pew Initiative found that 56%
of those polled who attend religious services a few times a year or less oppose animal
cloning (PIFB 2005). If asked about the genetic modification of animals -- rather than
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about animal cloning -- the percentage opposed drops slightly, but remains remarkably
consistent over a three-year tracking period. Pew researchers found 58% opposed to the
genetic modification of animals in 2003, 57% in 2004, and 56% in 2005 –
indistinguishable given the margin of error (PIFB 2003; PIFB 2004; PIFB 2005).
In the US debate, three main anti-biotechnology arguments are frequently made:
(1) the science amounts to “playing God;” (2) the science violates the natural world by
either crossing sacrosanct species boundaries or compromising animal’s integrity; and,
(3) it has harmful consequences to animals, the environment, or human beings. While all
of these arguments are suggestive, the current formulations leave them open to obvious
objections that are hard to overcome, making them easy targets of the proponents of
animal biotech. After reviewing the pitfalls in these arguments as they stand, I will
utilize their insights to support a “softer” conclusion: not a ban, but a stance of restraint.
The most common anti-biotechnology stance is the claim that this science
amounts to "man playing God" (Kass and Wilson 1998, p. 18), a role to which we are
said not to be entitled. On this argument, animal biotechnology is an attempt by human
beings to be divine. It crosses an important moral line between what Jeremy Rifkin has
described as facilitating the creation of life (as in assisted reproduction) and engineering
life (Rifkin 1998). In the former, human beings are the builders using a God-given
blueprint, whereas in the second, they are the architects. The force of this argument is
usually carried by the feelings of revulsion that people experience when they contemplate
cloning and other genetic modifications. On this emotive argument, these feelings are
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viewed as constituting all the justification one needs to reject biotechnology because
there is a profound "wisdom of repugnance" (Kass and Wilson 1998) underlying this
reaction.1
While this critique likely resonates on first glance with many people, it is a hard
claim to defend. Its first weakness is that it is too coarse an instrument to distinguish
between long-accepted breeding practices and the modifications the public finds
threatening and problematic. It not only brands all current biotechnology projects as
morally impermissible, but extends back in time to all past instances of genetic
engineering, low-tech and high tech, many of which have wide public support (Burkhardt
1998). Modification of animals, and in the process the creation of new species, is not
new. And moving forward, if this argument is correct, no projects in this new science are
ethically justifiable – no matter how great the gain for human welfare and no matter how
small the manipulation. On this argument, there can be no innocuous or neutral genetic
engineering because all of it makes the same fundamental mistake: assuming the role of
God. Therefore there can be no moral continuum of animal biotechnology from
permissible to impermissible. Context, motivation, means, purpose, scope and
consequence are irrelevant in deciding the moral worthiness of the project because the
whole science violates an important moral principle. But this does not square with the
data we have about the public’s moral intuitions. Support for genetic modification of
animals increases significantly when the purpose of the modification serves an important
human need. For example, the Pew research found that 57% of those polled found that
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producing organs for human transplant was a good reason to genetically alter animals
(Pew 2003). When the modification involves plants rather than animals, the purpose of
the modification correlates even more dramatically with public support. In this same
study, researchers found that 81% considered the production of better pharmaceuticals to
be a good reason to genetically modify plants, 71% considered the reduction of pesticides
to be a good reason, and 69% thought the creation of heart-healthy fats was a good reason
(Pew 2003). Because the “playing God” argument cannot clearly demarcate a moral line
that distinguishes projects that violate moral intuitions from those that don’t, it amounts
to an overly broad critique that cannot hone in on the essential criterion for moral
impermissibility in this area science.
Of course, if these arguments were valid, then the radical conclusion that all
biotechnology -- animal or plant -- is impermissible and should cease would simply be
true, whether it squared with our current intuitions or not. But these arguments are not
strong enough to secure this radical conclusion. As a rejoinder to the “playing God”
argument, not only do opponents argue that we have been modifying organisms
throughout human history and that only the means of modification have changed, but
they argue that it is equally plausible to claim that we are sanctioned by God to conduct
this science, evidenced by the intellectual acuity humankind was granted by their Creator
that motivates scientific curiosity. They argue that if the criticism of the new animal
biotechnology is the means of modification of life, then the real argument is about the
negative consequences to the animals, not a prohibition against playing God. If the
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criticism is that such work is not permitted by God, then it is just as plausible to argue
that this science has God’s blessing, just as all past scientific progress did. Ethicist Gary
Comstock, for example, coming from the perspective of an evangelical Protestant, argues
that God wants human beings to pursue science and he believes God endorses scientific
endeavors like biotechnology (Comstock 2001). It isn't playing God; it's doing what God
has given researchers the mental gifts to do. Animal cloning researcher Randall Prather
makes a similar argument in an essay on animal biotechnology:
But does biotechnology sound as if it could be unbiblical, evil, or an enterprise
with which we Christians should not associate?...Is this a form of “creating new
life,” tampering with something sacred, somehow playing God?...Should
reproductive biotechnologies be used on domestic animals? Since God does not
command against it, and it can increase the quality of life and help prevent famine
and human suffering, the answer is then: “Yes, these technologies should be
perfected and applied…” (Prather 1998).
Since debates hinging on interpretations of God’s will are interminable at best, Prather’s
argument is a powerful rejoinder. Given these weaknesses in the argument, the “playing
God” argument has no real force.
A second critique of animal biotechnology is that it constitutes a violation of
nature because it tampers with life in a way that undermines the natural order of things.
Again, this argument can be seen as a “close cousin” of the “playing God” concern, but it
takes a very different tact. Although this critique speaks to many forms of animal
biotechnology, it specifically targets transgenesis -- the introduction of a foreign gene
into the genome of an organism of a different species -- as a science that violates species
boundaries that are important not to cross. This argument from “unnaturalness” seems to
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have more clarity than the “playing God” argument because it focuses on only a subset of
technologies and does not rely on a particular understanding of divine will. However, it
relies instead -- not less problematically -- on difficult philosophical or scientific concepts
like “animal integrity” or “species.” Take the “animal integrity” argument first.
Although they offer a working definition of “integrity,” advocates of using this concept
as a means of moral evaluation for biotechnology are remarkably quick to conclude that
the concept is not an objectively grounded one and that giving the notion real content will
require a great deal of (future) work. In a highly cited essay arguing the merits of the
concept, authors Bovenkerk et al begin with a working definition of integrity as:
"wholeness and intactness of the animal and its species-specific balance, as well as the
capacity to sustain itself in an environment suitable to the species" (Bovenkerk, Brom
and Van Den Berg 2002, p. 17). But in their own discussion they admit that the
definition is actually very hard to defend, concluding: “The concept of integrity thus does
not refer to an objective state of affairs, but to one that we feel is important to preserve….
While it does not refer to empirically ascertainable biological facts, we can still establish
intersubjective criteria for its application. Through moral discussion, we can reach
agreement about which sorts of actions do and do not lead to violations of integrity”
(Bovenkerk, Brom and Van Den Berg 2002, p. 5-6). But if "animal integrity" really
means “manipulations of animal life that we condone,” rather than “an animal's rightful
biological state or condition,” then the notion of "integrity" is doing no work. "Animal
integrity” is really determined at the end of the moral conversation; it is not a tool to
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guide moral reflection about animal biotechnology. While this concept might gain
content after public dialogue about what constitutes morally permissible and
impermissible modifications of animals, it is not now a concept that can be legitimately
used to critique or assess current animal biotech projects.
The alternative argument from "unnaturalness" employs the concept "species"
rather than "animal integrity," and it encounters parallel problems, as Jason Scott Robert
and Francoise Baylis have recently pointed (Robert and Baylis 2003). On this argument,
animal biotechnology projects that violate species boundaries are morally problematic.
Building a moral argument on what appears to be an objective, scientific category seems
to be a good argumentative strategy, but philosophers and biologists are quick to point
out the fluidity of what we take to be a species, undermining the notion that these are
natural or fixed kinds. This argument has been effectively made by Robert and Baylis
who argue, “[E]ssentialism – or at least stock conceptions of essentialism according to
which a species is identified by essential intrinsic properties – is at odd with evolutionary
biology…As against what was once commonly presumed, there would appear to be no
such thing as fixed species identities” (Robert and Baylis 2003, pp. 5-6). There may be a
legitimate concern here related to the mixing of species at the speed and level at which
we now seem (or will soon be) capable, but the argument as it stands is not powerful or
qualified enough to overcome this science-based objection.
An additional problem that plagues both of the “unnaturalness” arguments is that
the force of the claims is often carried by the emotive response that people have to animal
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biotechnology. Arguments that turn on people’s emotional reactions are often derisively
labeled as “Yuck Factor”2 arguments. The problem with arguments that are purely
emotive is that they lack the ability to persuade anyone who doesn’t already share these
same intuitions or feelings because they are not backed by rational argument or
justification. Scientists, for example, who are pursuing various projects in animal
biotechnology, presumably do not feel revulsion in response to the work they are doing.
They might legitimately ask in response to arguments that appeal to emotion: “Why
should I feel that way?” -- a question that must be answered if the argument is to have
any true weight. “Yuck factor” arguments, then, must always be anchored by rational
justification, even if they have an initial appeal to emotional reaction. In the case at hand,
the real justification for opposition to certain types of biotechnology cannot remain a
moral intuition or feeling, but must be grounded in the moral judgment that underlies that
feeling. And that moral judgment has not been well articulated by this camp.
As an illustration of an emotive strategy in the “unnaturalness” arguments, I
return to the “animal integrity” argument. Bovenkerk et al write, "When we envision the
future in which we buy eggs from a warehouse housing hundreds of rows of flesh colored
humps created from what we once knew as chickens, a feeling of discomfort comes over
us. We -- or many of us, anyway -- have a moral intuition that changing chickens into
living egg machines is wrong. The moral notion that gives voice to this intuition is
‘integrity.’” (Bovenkerk, Brom and Van Den Berg 2002, p. 5-6, italics added). In other
words, "integrity" is supposed to be the normative explanation or moral judgment that
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underlies the feelings of revulsion. So far, so good. If “animal integrity” can now be
cashed out independent of our moral feelings, it could plausibly function as the
justification or anchor that the argument needs. But what does "integrity" turn out to be?
Again Bovenkerk et al: “And even if we could not reach this agreement [“about which
sorts of actions do and do not lead to violations of integrity”], the notion of integrity still
has an important function, namely to clarify the moral debate and criticize existing
practices. Integrity can give opponents of [this] thought experiment a way to voice their
criticism of the creation of living egg machines…” (Bovenkerk, Brom and Van Den Berg
2002, p. 5-6). Bovenkerk et al treat the task of defining "animal integrity" as optional,
believing it can still be used as a term of critique in the biotechnology debate even
without being given independent content. But if we fail to give convincing content to the
notion of "integrity," then the term refers to nothing but our emotive response to those
existing practices. Without a substantive account, that critique will simply amount to
another way of saying "Yuck," which has little argumentative power against those whose
intuitions differ from one’s own. All of this is not to say that our moral intuitions or
feelings can play no role in making a moral judgment; it is simply to argue that many
have mistaken that role. Feelings can legitimately serve as a starting point for reflection,
raising awareness about what we ought to pay moral attention to. In fact, I will argue -as others have suggested (Midgley 2000; Streiffer 2003) -- that the feelings most people
have when they contemplate projects of animal cloning or transgenesis ought to serve for
us, not as an argument, but as an important red flag. But until the “unnaturalness” claims
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are backed by convincing argument or explanation, they remain merely suggestive,
offering little guidance in evaluating real projects in animal biotechnology.
The other approach in the anti-biotechnology debate is a set of consequentialist
arguments that critique animal biotechnology on grounds of animal pain and suffering or
the adverse effects it could have on the environment or human beings. While the
consequentialist strategy provides some very concrete guidance in assessing the moral
permissibility of these projects, it has a serious limitation: because it hinges on adverse
outcomes, it's critique only applies where untoward consequences can plausibly be
argued; but the set of projects in animal biotechnology that is likely to have negative
consequences is much smaller than the number and types of projects people are
intuitively disturbed by. If our moral intuitions do serve as a legitimate red flag, then the
consequentialist critique does not provide an adequate articulation of those moral
intuitions.
Take, for example, the pain and suffering of animals in biotechnology research,
the focus of most consequentialist arguments (Rollin 1995; Thompson 1997; Rollin 2003;
Thompson 2003). Insofar as animals experience a unique level or type of suffering
through this research, the argument against genetic engineering or transgenesis is quite
powerful. But two cases need to be made in order for the consequentialist critique of
animal biotechnology to be persuasive. First, animal suffering in this type of research
must be shown to be significantly greater than in any other area of pharmaceutical or
medical research in order for animal suffering to explain the large gap in public support
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between the former and the latter. (Polls show that only 32% of Americans believe that
using animals in medical research is morally wrong, whereas twice as many Americans,
64%, find animal cloning morally wrong [Saad 2004]). Making the case that the quantity
of animal suffering in this new science is measurably greater than in labs that do no
genetic modification is a difficult task, as others have pointed out (Greene 2002). The
second case that needs to be made to bolster the consequentialist critique is that, when the
animals do not suffer through this type of research, there is nothing morally problematic
with this type of research (barring some other untoward consequence to the environment
or to human beings). But this view does not resonate with the public’s intuition. Thus,
the consequentialists’ argument doesn’t capture the moral unease people have with the
projects that cause no animal pain and suffering. In the thought experiment referred to
above, in which chickens have been replaced by non-sentient, senseless egg machines
(Comstock 1992; Bovenkerk, Brom and Van Den Berg 2002), there cannot be any
perceived suffering on the part of the chicken-like humps because they have been
engineered to have no powers of sense perception; they feel nothing. Not only can
consequentialists not easily critique this futuristic creation, they are under some
obligation to embrace it because this would represent a marked reduction in the overall
suffering of our current egg-producers. The terrible conditions of chickens in typical
American poultry farms are well known (Animal Welfare Institute 1987; Scully 2002).
Animal advocates like United Poultry Concerns President Karen Davis argue, “They are
proliferating lives that endure nothing but misery. It’s the new horror for animals in the
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21st century” (Cacchioli 2002). The most consistent position for the consequentialist,
then, is to embrace the animal biotech solutions that will eliminate this type of suffering.
In summary, then, while the consequentialist arguments are compelling as far as
they go, they have limited scope because they rely on adverse effects, which often cannot
plausibly be argued. In cases like the hypothetical senseless egg machines, the
consequentialist arguments fail to capture the intuition most people have that such
research is disturbing. The other anti-biotechnology arguments – the “playing God”
argument and its close cousin, the argument on grounds of “unnaturalness,” though both
suggestive, also fail to make a compelling case for an all-out prohibition of this science,
which is their aim.
Part of the problem in the current debate is that the anti-biotech arguments extend
a reach that exceeds their grasp: they aim for a prohibition of all animal biotechnology,
where there may only be justification for caution or restraint. But the intuitions
underlying these anti-biotech arguments can be articulated as valid moral reasons that
speak against our current approach to this science: blanket permission with only minimal
regulation.3 On my view, the moral claims that can be made against this technology do
justify a default position of restraint, and I borrow from the insights of this first set of
arguments to lay out this case in the next section.
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Justifying a “Presumption of Restraint” in Animal Biotechnology
To argue for a Presumption of Restraint in this science, I want to start with
projects that cannot plausibly be argued to serve the greater human good or radically
improve human life, human health, or even animal health. To start here is to remove the
noble purposes and motivations of many projects in animal biotechnology that may
ultimately override the Presumption of Restraint in those cases, but at the stage of setting
the presumption, these noble purposes detract from the critique that justifies a default
position of caution. So I will focus as a case study on projects like the novelty pet or
animal-as-art-object to bring into clear relief what seems most troubling about animal
biotech in general.
Lest one think such projects are in the far-off future, Chicago-based artist
Eduardo Kac recently commissioned the creation of a transgenic rabbit that glows green
under special lighting (Allmendinger 2001). “Alba,” as she’s known, is the first object of
what Kac hopes will be “a new art form based on the use of genetic engineering to
transform natural or synthetic genes to an organism, to create unique living beings” (Kac
2002). The French lab that created Alba, the renowned French National Institute for
Agricultural Research, did not conduct the research for the purpose of making art – their
motivation was the development of a reliable means for identifying transgenic animals as
part of their work on biopharming (the production of pharmaceuticals by using transgenic
animals). But Kac’s motive was art alone, and when he attempted to remove Alba from
the lab to attend the Avignon art festival, the lab denied his request. While in this case,
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the creation of the rabbit was motivated for two different purposes by two different actors
(Kac , for art and the French lab, for science), the next “Alba” will not be. The more
recent, commercialized “GloFish” makes this clear. Modified to contain the green
florescent protein (GFP) of the jellyfish and the red florescent protein (RFP) of the sea
anemone, the ordinarily dull-colored zebra fish has been transformed into a fish that
glows (http://www.glofish.com/). As the technology progresses unimpeded, these
creatures can be expected to be just the first – and least radical -- in a long line.
The creation of a default position of restraint begins with a review of the ordinary
facts that form a backdrop to all animal biotechnology. Though the very existence of
"facts" is disputable by some, I take the following claims to be fairly uncontroversial.
First, living organisms and the ecosystem are vastly complex and nuanced. Second, we
didn’t put life on this planet; we are not the causal agent of life being here. In fact, we
are just two-bit manipulators compared to nature or evolution or God. Whatever or
whoever is responsible for life being here, we know it was not the agency of human
beings. Third, not only are human beings not the creators of life on the planet, we can
barely even blueprint certain aspects of some forms of life. We can’t fully explain or
understand the mechanisms of life, let alone repair or restore much in the natural world
(think: cancer, global warming, tears in the ozone). The complexity is beyond both our
comprehension and mastery. And fourth, we depend on the natural world, and our
interventions in it can threaten our existence in more and less profound ways that mirror
the threat to (or destruction of) other forms of life that we have caused. Add to this set of
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facts another specifically relevant to the case of the novelty pet or animal-as-art-object.
First, these creatures are alive: they are sentient, they can feel pain, and they can feel
something like fear (maybe even terror). Second, like all research animals, they are
dependent on human beings for their subsistence and have no control over their treatment
(not only how they will fare, but what they will become), and this makes them
vulnerable.
Where do these uncontroversial facts get us? More specifically, what is the moral
critique of projects like Alba as art project? I argue that they lead to five ethical claims.
First, the facts just noted establish that the domain that is being manipulated and altered
in animal biotechnology is one of great seriousness, and this fact demands that projects in
this area are treated with great care and reflection. We didn’t create the genome, and we
can’t recreate it, even in its simplest manifestation; at this point, we can’t even repair it.
We are directly tampering with the building blocks of life, which we barely understand.
Given the complexity of the natural world, our only rudimentary understanding of it, and
what’s at stake if we irrevocably harm it, the power to engineer life ought to inspire in us
a feeling of “awe” -- the mixture of dread, veneration, and wonder that makes one take
pause. The power to alter living beings at a rate and a level never before possible is, if
nothing else, a serious venture. Frivolous projects (undertaken to amuse or entertain
ourselves, done simply because we can, or done because it might be profitable) reduce a
profound act to the level of play, or even jest; it makes the category-error of classifying
complex living beings as mere art supplies or trivial building materials. The lack of
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seriousness in the choice to use this power to create objects for entertainment is seen
most clearly when placed against the backdrop of the seemingly intractable problems we
currently face, for example, world hunger or devastating disease. Expending precious
scientific resources and human ingenuity on pure amusement or entertainment is
frivolous and wasteful. In summary, the first moral problem with creating Alba is that
using the power of genetically altering life requires a serious, pressing reason, and
modification to generate novelty pets and art forms is not one.
The second moral problem with Alba is that such projects are reckless and
unreflective because they proceed with a negligent lack of caution about what the broader
implications and consequences of such projects might be -- not only, most obviously,
consequences to animal welfare or the environment (as consequentialists rightly claim),
but understood more broadly to include the transformations they may effect in our view
of nature and our role in it. We have history to show us that lack of foresight about the
consequences of our interventions in the natural world can be devastating, but we are
now seeing interventions at a level and scale that can alter who we are, what our world
looks like, what inhabits it, and our view of ourselves -- and we may not like what we
see. In her essay “Biotechnology and Monstrosity,” Mary Midgley writes:
Anyone who doesn't think this kind of delay [for reflection] is necessary -- anyone
who wants people to rush with aplomb into this mass investment of mind and
resources -- does have to be calling for a drastically changed view of nature as a
whole, a view which claims that our power and knowledge are such that we can
rationally expect to alter everything. To feel this kind of confidence, we would
need to stop thinking of the natural world as a colossally complex system with its
own laws, a system that we, as a tiny part of it, must somehow try to fit into, and
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begin instead to see it simply as the consignment of inert raw material laid out for
our use (Midgley 2000, p. 12).
This transformation of how we regard the natural world may already be taking place,
without our notice or concern. The speed at which we have pursued projects whose ends
can’t plausibly be deemed worthy or good provides evidence for Midgley’s concern
because biotechnology is being placed in the category of activities that needs no
justification. With biotechnology for medical or pharmaceutical application, there is an
implicit argument that this scientific activity is justifiable because of the good that will
come from it; with biotechnology for art or entertainment, there is a different implicit
argument, namely, that this kind of scientific activity doesn't have any implications that
are worth worrying about (since, if there were something to worry about in this activity,
its continuance would require something to justify it like “noble ends,” or something that
would carry the same weight). But this stance towards unbounded animal biotechnology
is both imprudent and naive. Where will transgenic projects like Alba and the Glofish
take us? Who we will become because of them? What will we end up with? Is the world
that we are creating one that we will still want to inhabit? And, not least of all, what
havoc will we wreak on the natural world through them: on the environment, delicate
ecosystems, the animals themselves? In summary, the second reason to worry morally
about projects like Alba is that the rate and scale with which we can now alter the world
we live in demands careful reflection of the consequences, broadly construed (not limited
to risk assessment, for example), and we seem incapable of pausing long enough to
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engage in those reflections. Until the deeper questions raised by such projects have been
asked and answered, bulldozing ahead with this type of genetic modification is reckless.
The third moral critique of such projects harkens back to the “playing God”
argument discussed earlier. The argument against “playing God” failed because it
constituted a blanket prohibition against any and all modifications of nature without
being able to specify or differentiate which projects were impermissible and why. But
good sense can be made of the intuition that some animal biotechnology projects overstep
the boundaries of human beings’ proper sphere. The normative term that gives content to
this intuition is “hubris,” an exaggerated pride and overconfidence about both our
capacity to safely engineer life and our ability to prudently navigate the path it puts us on.
“Hubris” in this sense is a secular term that does not rely on theology or divine will. It is
simply the claims that we have lost the proper humility about the enormous power
biotechnology affords us and that we are displaying a stunning arrogance about our
ability to control it. To avoid the charge of hubris, we need to demonstrate that we can
reign ourselves in, see the ill of unlimited “progress” here. In summary, the third moral
reason speaking against projects like Alba is that they demonstrate an exaggerated
confidence in our ability to safely and wisely employ this powerful tool; there is no
demonstrated concern with such projects that this technology could go too far, which it
surely could.
The fourth critique of projects like Alba is that they violate a fundamental, widely
accepted principle of animal research: animals are only to be used if the cost to them is
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outweighed by an important potential benefit to human or animal life. While the moral
status of animal species is far from settled, it is certain that they have the capacity to
suffer. Animal suffering through biotechnology research runs the gamut from
compromised health status to inflicted pain to whatever distress occurs from life in a cage
(Rollin 1995). Perhaps animal suffering in science can be legitimately trumped by other
serious moral considerations, but of what potency is the consideration of art or
entertainment up against the suffering of a sentient creature? Whatever we decide is the
morally justified role for animals in research, surely that judgment will have to take into
account the very real suffering of the animals involved in that or other types of genetic
modification, but that decision must involve a weighing and a balancing of the benefits to
humans (or animals) on the one hand and the consequences to the research animals on the
other. In research explicitly designed to create novelty pets or art forms, there is nothing
on the justification side of the equation. Engaging in a project like creating a novelty pet
that has nothing on the first side of the equation demonstrates an inability to recognize
what's at stake on the other. How much did (does or will) Alba suffer? And how many
other rabbits suffered before a glowing rabbit was achieved? That's information we don't
have. But we do know that in all of the talk about this "new art form" there was no
discussion of the potential suffering to the "unique living beings” that would be created in
the process. Whatever the cost to sentient life in projects like these, it is surely too much
for the gain. In summary, projects like Alba disregard the basic tenet of animal research:
the weighing and balancing of costs and benefits.
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The fifth reason that speaks against such projects is closely related to hubris, and
it cashes out the powerful feelings of revulsion or disgust many feel in reaction to certain
types of biotechnology. Although Alba serves as a fairly good case study for this
critique, it is the "senseless egg machines" -- the foil in the animal integrity story -- that
best aide us in fleshing out those intuitions. Making rabbits glow or transforming
chickens into senseless heaps of flesh debases and adulterates sentient beings by our own,
direct hand. To downgrade the function of a living being or redesign life according to
any purpose of our choosing shows a disregard for life as we found it. As the most
powerful species on the planet, we have dominion by default. But to reduce an animal’s
function or recreate it based on whim or caprice reflects negatively on us as guardians.
Our role should be one of “protectors,” not “debasers.” These projects demonstrate an
inflated sense of ownership and entitlement: this is not a world of our making and the
entities in it are not things, but such projects imply that they are. In summary, the fifth
critique is that animals’ independent existence apart from us demands a strong resistance
to debasement or adulteration by our hand, and these projects unflinchingly embrace such
debasement or adulteration.
In response to this fifth critique, there will no doubt be two objections. The first
is that there are plenty of non-GM modes of adulteration or debasement of animal life, so
this is not morally worse. The obvious response to this objection is twofold: debasement
through genetic modification may not be worse than non-GM debasement, but that is not
a sound defense of either mode; and, the speed and extent to which we can now
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adulterate or debase an animal at the genomic level makes the stakes much higher than
past modes. A second objection is that this fifth critique requires the problematic
concept of "animal integrity” we discussed earlier. But it does not. "Integrity" relies on a
static conception of the characteristics of a species that is betrayed by biological facts
(like evolution). Think about the following definition of “animal integrity”: the
"wholeness and intactness of the animal and its species-specific balance, as well as the
capacity to sustain itself in an environment suitable to the species" (Bovenkerk, Brom
and Van Den Berg 2002, p. 17). In contrast, "debasement" or “adulteration” is a
comparative term that requires only a human-initiated action and a change from a higher
status or function to a lower one. If a chicken previously could do x, and can now only
do y because of something we have done to it to serve our own purposes, then we have
debased it. This relies only on our everyday observations of the capacities and
characteristics of different types of animals; it takes no stand on the fluidity of species,
species-interests, or biological wholeness. This way of understanding what's wrong with
such genetic modification makes a friendly amendment to Bovenkerk et. al. as a way of
solving one problem in the concept of "integrity" (Bovenkerk, Brom and Van Den Berg
2002, p. 17-18). In their essay, they reflect on two instances of docking a dog's tail: when
the tail is docked for aesthetic reasons, and when the tail must be docked for medical
reasons. They argue that our intuition finds the first instance problematic but the second
morally justifiable. They conclude (rightly, on my view) that this undermines the
concept of biological or bodily integrity because the dog's body is mutilated in the exact
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same way in both cases. But the concept of "debasement" can make sense of our
different moral judgments in the two cases. Debasement has embedded in it a criterion of
intention: we “debase” or “adulterate” when we are not motivated by the promotion of
the good of the entity being changed. If we must dock a dog's tail to preserve its health,
we are motivated by the good of the dog. If we dock a dog's tail because our tastes run to
dogs without tails, then we are motivated by self-interest and not the good of the dog. In
the former case, we rescue the animal, and this reflects well on us; in the latter, we debase
it. and it reflects poorly.
Based on these five moral critiques of projects like Alba, we can now justify a
Presumption of Restraint in animal biotechnology. A “presumption,” philosophically
speaking, is a default principle that guides action in the absence of compelling, overriding
reasons that speak in the action’s favor. A presumption is not a prohibition; it is a set of
conditions that must be met in order to “trump” the default position. I argue that these
five reasons not only justify a Presumption of Restraint, but they provide the set of moral
considerations we need to overcome in order to justify a project in animal biotechnology.
The Alba case was a foil that facilitated the articulation of those moral considerations.
Taken together, they constitute valid moral reasons -- not based on pure emotion or
spurious concepts -- to proceed with caution in the area of animal biotechnology research.
Like all presumptions, this one can certainly be overridden. What would that
involve? To overcome the Presumption of Restraint in animal biotechnology, a project
must demonstrate: 1) a pressing reason to take the dramatic step of genetically altering
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life; 2) careful consideration of the potential consequences of the project, including the
“big picture” concerns of how we are radically, possibly irreversibly, altering our world;
3) a recognition that unbridled animal biotechnology could create a world we no longer
recognize or want to live in, which means that our animal biotechnology projects must be
carefully, reflectively chosen; 4) a clear regard for the basic tenet of animal research, i.e.,
that the benefit must far outweigh the cost; and 5) a strong resistance to debasement and
adulteration of sentient life.

The Presumption of Restraint and the Precautionary Principle
Given the similarity in terminology and the analogous “proceed with caution”
stance, one might understandably ask how the Presumption of Restraint differs from the
Precautionary Principle that now figures prominently in debates about risk assessment of
new technologies.4 The answer is that these are two completely different animals. The
Precautionary Principle is a moral mandate to take preemptive, preventative measures
against possible harms even in the absence of certainty that such harms will occur. The
clearest statement of the Precautionary Principle comes from what is known as the
“Wingspread Statement,” named for a conference center where the most commonly used
version of the principle was formulated: “Where an activity raises threats of harm to the
environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some
cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically” (Wingspread 1998).
The Presumption of Restraint, in stark contrast, is a justificatory process – a gate-keeping
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mechanism – to determine which projects should move forward and which ought to be
rejected based on a set of moral considerations that extends well beyond concerns merely
about safety to the environment or human health.
The Precautionary Principle is a narrow version of what I list as the second moral
consideration that must be addressed for a project to override the Presumption of
Restraint: in the Precautionary Principle the consequences that must be considered are
reduced to an assessment of environmental and human risk; in my second moral
consideration, the consequences extend much more broadly to “big picture” concerns
about the way in which the project alters the world we live in and what inhabits it. One
similarity between the Presumption of Restraint and the Precautionary Principle is that
the burden of proof for showing that the respective criteria for permissibility has been
met falls on the innovator, not the public. Again, from the Wingspread document: “In
this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, bears the burden of
proof” (Wingspread 1998).

Conclusion: The Presumption of Restraint Moving Forward
Presumptions -- and the considerations for overriding them -- are not algorithms:
they do not provide a definitive diagnostic to determine which projects we ought to
support and which we ought to condemn. The purpose of a presumption is to set the
terms of the discussion, not to provide an algorithmic decision-procedure, and this means
that reflective participants in the debate might legitimately disagree in their
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determinations of moral permissibility on any particular project. But the Presumption of
Restraint in animal biotechnology accomplishes an important first step in structuring the
debate: it provides sound moral reasons to critique certain projects in animal
biotechnology that cannot be easily dismissed by proponents of the science. The strategy
of the Presumption of Restraint is also not limited to projects in animal biotechnology: it
can be employed – albeit based on different moral considerations – to assess the
permissibility of projects in other arenas of novel technology, such as human cloning,
enhancement, or nanotechnology. What I have articulated here is a method of assessment
that may have broad uses as technological innovation moves forward.
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1

It should be noted that Leon Kass, who made this argument famous, was not speaking about
biotechnology in general, but was making an argument specifically against human cloning. Although it
was not originally motivated by animal biotechnology, it has become the most pervasive line of attack
against animal cloning and transgenesis.
2
This term was coined by Arthur Caplan (Caplan 1994).
3
Of course, it needs to be repeated here that all research in the United States involving animals goes
through a review of the Institutional Animal Care & Use Committees (IACUC), and this review goes a long
way in protecting animals against certain types of suffering. And it also true that scientists make their own
moral assessment about which projects are morally justifiable, and that certainly serves as a second,
informal, type of “review.” But beyond the formal IACUC review and the informal moral assessment by
the scientists or funding agency, animal biotech research in the US has very wide, loose guidelines and
boundaries.
4
For an excellent historical account of the development and evolution of the precautionary principle, see
Magnus 2007.
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